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The Conservative plans to replace the Human Rights Act 1998 with a British Bill of Rights 
have refocused the attention on the roots of the scepticism surrounding the incorporation of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). One major source of discontent is the 
relative power of domestic and Strasbourg authorities, in particular the claim that the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) frequently oversteps the boundaries of its 
interpretative competence. Lord Sumption’s extra-judicial critique forcefully illustrates this 
perceived illegitimacy: ‘the [ECtHR]... has become the international flag-bearer for judge-
made fundamental law extending well beyond the text... [It] develops the Convention… so as 
to reflect its own view of what rights are required in a modern democracy’.1 Whereas States’ 
acceptance of judicial innovation depends on multiple factors, the main objection is that the 
ECtHR ‘exceed[s] the jurisdiction conferred upon it by their original consent’.2 This article 
argues that the convergence of practice amongst a substantial majority of Council of Europe 
(CoE) States (‘European consensus’) legitimises evolutive interpretation qua implied revision 
of the original mandate. It also welcomes the reliance on public support for human rights 
reform within the respondent State (‘local consensus’) in the absence of sufficient 
commonalities in Europe. My (somewhat counter-intuitive) contention is that both doctrines 
reflect the Convention’s attachment to the democratic society and the allocation of powers 
between national authorities and European supervision.  
Section A explains the value of European consensus by reference to the legitimising 
function of the comparative method in international adjudication. I thus dispute the Court’s 
authority to adopt purely aspirational interpretations. Section B rejects the view that 
methodological transparency in the consensus analysis would be counter-productive and 
proposes a ‘checklist’ of criteria, based on concerns raised by the case-law: sample selection, 
proportion of States deemed to constitute a sufficient majority, inattention to the coverage of 
all geopolitical blocs, over-emphasis on extra-European trends, hasty generalisations, 
different treatment of comparable ratios. I argue that, when the checklist is not satisfied, 
shifting the focus to public opinion in the respondent State is preferable to both deference and 
overstretching European consensus. I distinguish between two sub-categories of local 
consensus. A ‘rights-minimising’ local consensus (rejected in the past, successful in A, B and 
C v Ireland)
3
 allows national standards falling below European standards to prevail based on 
strong societal support; section C draws a parallel with the limited reach of the ‘persistent 
objector’ under customary law,4 suggesting that it should have even less bearing when applied 
to a quasi-constitutional instrument (a position arguably supported now by A.L. (X.W.) v 
Russia).
5
 The second version, a ‘rights-maximising’ local consensus (illustrated by Oliari v 
Italy),
6
 invokes public opinion to expand the respondent’s Convention obligations without 
generalising erga omnes partes. Section D maintains that the apparent inconsistency of this 
method with Strasbourg subsidiarity and respect for democratic processes (understood as 
parliamentary deliberation) is removed by a wider reading of the ‘democratic society’ 
                                                          
1
 Lord Sumption, The Limits of Law, Kuala Lumpur lecture, 20 November 2013 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131120.pdf>. 
2
 F De Londras - K Dzehtsiarou, ‘Managing Judicial Innovation in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2015) 
15 HRLR 525, 528. 
3
 A, B and C v Ireland (25579/05), 16 December 2010. 
4
 A State exempting itself from the application of a rule the formation of which it constantly opposed. See J 
Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of International Law (OUP, 2012), 28. 
5
 A.L. (X.W.) v Russia  (44095/14), 29 October 2015. 
6
 Oliari v Italy (18766/11;36030/11), 21 July 2015. 
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principle, emphasising the role of public opinion and domestic constitutional courts in a 
functional democracy.  
State-specific assessments of compliance are a positive trade-off between 
controversial pan-European standards and localised but effective supra-national control. A 
temporary ‘variable geometry’ of rights is also preferable to reining in evolutive interpretation 
altogether whilst waiting for European consensus to crystallise. The Conclusions thus argue 
that local consensus is a legitimate interpretive tool if it maximises human-rights protection 
within a State when domestic democratic processes are jammed; conversely, it should not 
accommodate a version of persistent objection that destabilises the European consensus 
orthodoxy and is detrimental to the quasi-constitutionalist project of the Convention. 
 
 
A. THE CONTRIBUTION OF ‘EUROPEAN CONSENSUS’ TO LEGITIMACY AND 
COMPLIANCE 
 
The ECtHR’s function as a standard-setting body meets important institutional constraints. Its 
mandate ‘[t]o ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the [parties]’7 is not 
unfettered discretion to make, rather than ascertain, the law. As Mahoney cautioned, 
‘[e]ntrusting to judges a task of evolutive interpretation should not mean… carte blanche to 
push forward the frontiers of progress according to their own personal notions of justice’.8 
State consent remains the ‘indispensable basis of legitimacy in all realms of international 
law’.9 This extends to tribunals, for instance the International Court of Justice cannot 
adjudicate ex aequo et bono save for the parties’ express request, and equity-based rulings do 
not purport to clarify international law.
10
 Letsas’ proposition that treaty interpretation is 
determining ‘fact-independent moral values’11 disregards the ‘voluntarist and co-operative 
character’ of international law.12 The ECtHR’s role is not to cast subjective ideals as binding 
obligations, but to identify the ‘common heritage’ of ‘like-minded’ States.13 According to 
Wildhaber et al, ECHR rights ‘imitate and reinforce those pre-existing in many domestic legal 
systems’.14 By undertaking a comparative review, as van der Meersch explained, the Court is 
‘having recourse to a “common law” which derives… from the general body of the 
Contracting States’ laws… and by which the Convention itself was inspired’.15  
European consensus thus provides an objective, measurable interpretive criterion, as 
opposed to the judges’ individual moral preferences. Mahoney colourfully suggested that 
‘[t]he evolving standards in the Convention… should not simply be plucked from the sky by 
the judge’.16 In fact, under Article 31(3)(b) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
                                                          
7
 Article 19 ECHR. 
8
 P Mahoney, ‘Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the European Court of Human Rights: Two Sides 
of the Same Coin’ (1990) 11 HRLJ 57, 68. 
9
 J Cabranes, ‘Customary International Law: What It Is and What It Is Not’ (2011) 22(1) Duke J.Int'l&Comp.L. 
143, 148. 
10
 Art 38(2) ICJ Statute. 
11
 G Letsas, ‘Strasbourg’s Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer’ (2010) 21(3) EJIL 509, 512. 
12
 Crawford, cit, 16. 
13
 Art 1 Statute of the Council of Europe, ECHR Preamble. 
14
 L Wildhaber, A Hjartarson, S Donnelly, ‘No Consensus on Consensus? The Practice of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (2013) 33 HRLJ 248, 251. 
15
 WG van der Meersch,  ‘Reliance, in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, on the Domestic 
Law of the States’ (1980) 1 HRLJ 13, 15. 
16
 Mahoney, ‘Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint’, cit, 72.  
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(VCLT), accepted by the ECtHR as binding,
17
 the interpreter must examine the parties’ 
‘subsequent practice’ in the implementation of the treaty as evidence of their understanding of 
the norms. Interpretation therefore requires an empirical exercise, aimed at finding the 
signatories’ prevalent interpretation. In the presence of mere trends, the Court ‘should wait for 
further consolidation and corroboration and… only then proceed to find a “consensus”’.18 
Indeed the decision of a minority to go beyond the minimum shared standards cannot modify 
all parties’ obligations. For example, as acknowledged in Parry v UK, the choice of several 
States to open marriage to same-sex partners reflects their own vision of marriage, not ECHR 
obligations.
19
  
The relevance of ‘State practice’ is not undisputed; Benvenisti claims that consent is 
an outmoded concept and, by emphasising sovereign commitments, the Court ‘relinquishes its 
duty to set universal standards’.20 Yet sovereignty and the ‘enduring force of consent as a 
fundamental principle’21 remain constant features of the non-hierarchical global society. 
Certainly, human-rights bodies enjoy wider discretion than other adjudication fora, as they 
interpret law-making treaties based on ‘open-textured’22 notions. Additionally, as Neuman 
argued, human-rights treaties are distinguishable from other agreements by virtue of their 
prominent ‘suprapositive’ aspect – the underlying normative principles embodied in positive 
norms, whether ‘natural law, religious traditions, universal morality’.23 It is, however, 
insufficient for judges to affirm what they assume to be the content thereof. International 
tribunals entrusted to apply specific treaties (rather than natural law) cannot purport to have 
the monopoly on truth.  
The claim that Strasbourg authorities should adopt a ‘moral reading’24 further 
presupposes that morality is univocal and can be abstractly determined, which is belied by 
historical observation. Currently prohibited by a jus cogens norm,
25
 slavery was not deemed 
morally unacceptable by the international society until the 1815 Congress of Vienna (Britain 
abolished it in 1833, providing compensation to slave-owners for the loss of their 
‘property’…), and a Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery was still 
necessary in 1956.
26
 This revolution from legal assent to absolute bar disproves the 
assumption that moral values underpinning positive obligations are objectively accessible to 
the interpreter. As the Human Rights Committee recognised in Hertzberg v Finland, ‘public 
morals differ widely’ and ‘[t]here is no universally applicable common standard’.27 
Strasbourg jurisprudence has confirmed that the requirements of morals also vary within the 
more cohesive CoE, and, as expressed in Handyside v UK, ‘[b]y reason of their direct and 
continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in 
a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these 
                                                          
17
 I Ziemele, ‘Customary International Law in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights – The 
Method’ (2013) 12 The Law & Practice of Int’l Courts and Tribunals 243. 
18
 Wildhaber et al, ‘No Consensus on Consensus’, cit, 257. 
19
 Parry v UK (42971/05), 28 November 2006. 
20
 E Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards (1999) 31(4) N.Y.U.J. Int'l 
L.&Pol. 843, 852. 
21
 L Helfer, ‘Nonconsensual International Lawmaking’ (2008) 1 U.Ill.L.Rev. 71, 72. 
22
 N Lavender, ‘The Problem of the Margin of Appreciation’ (1997) 4 EHRLR 380, 390. 
23
 G Neuman, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance’ (2003) 55 Stan.L.Rev. 
1863, 1868-9. 
24
 Letsas, ibid. 
25
 See A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (CUP, 2013), 279. 
26
 P Halstead, Unlocking Human Rights (Abingdon, Routledge, 2014), 5-7. In the USA the abolition of slavery 
did not occur until 1865. 
27
 Hertzberg v Finland (61/1979), 2 April 1982, para.10.3. 
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requirements’.28 A comparative glance at regional instruments further reveals different rights 
prioritisations. The Inter-American Convention on Human Rights protects life ‘from the 
moment of conception’,29 while ECHR guarantees do not include pre-natal life.30 
Significantly, the lists of non-derogable rights do not overlap.
31
 The proposition that 
‘universal morality’ is well-equipped to justify an evolutive reading also fails to explain 
dissension within tribunals, including disagreement at the admissibility stage on what is 
‘manifestly’ ill-founded. Greer and Wildhaber noted that ‘judicial agendas and perceptions 
differ’ and ‘there are various ways of safeguarding most human rights’.32 The consensus 
doctrine thus attenuates the individual interpreter’s bias and enhances the legitimacy of 
ECtHR rulings.  
There are also pragmatic objections to interpretation unsupported by State practice. 
Large-scale non-compliance would reinforce the position, already adopted in some 
jurisdictions,
33
 that selective implementation is the normalcy of the relationship with the 
Court. Lacking autonomous enforcement tools, the Court depends on the credibility of its 
judgments and compliance-inducive peer pressure within CoE. As Krisch put it, judges need 
to be ‘impartial and trustworthy interpreters’ and cautious ‘not to upset national authorities so 
much as to provoke a backlash’.34 Helfer observed that ‘nonconsensual lawmaking may 
generate domestic opposition to compliance or, more rarely, pressure to withdraw from the 
treaty’.35 Current British debates confirm that this is more than just an academic 
consideration. The partnership between Strasbourg and domestic authorities, on which the 
effectiveness of the system relies, may occasionally recommend deference to ‘ethical 
decentralisation’.36  
This view is further supported by the overall ECHR philosophy. As Spano noted, ‘the 
Convention is not an instrument of human rights unification,… but only lays down minimum 
standards’.37 The comparative review of domestic laws assists the Court in identifying them 
objectively. In Tyrer v UK, the Court held that it ‘cannot but be influenced by the 
developments and commonly accepted standards’ of CoE States.38 Similarly, in Marckx v 
Belgium, the ECtHR ‘[could not] but be struck by the fact that the domestic law of the great 
majority of the member States of the Council of Europe ha[d] evolved’.39 Albeit judge-made, 
the ‘consensus’ doctrine is traceable to Article 31 VCLT; it relies on the ECHR’s ‘object and 
purpose’ – including, as the ‘context’ suggests, the ‘maintenance and further realisation’ of 
human rights
40
 – and on ‘subsequent practice’. Moreover, it has received a posteriori 
validation from member States through ‘acquiescence’.41 This mitigates Dzehtsiarou’s 
                                                          
28
 Handyside v UK (5493/72), 7 December 1976, para.48. 
29
 See Art 4(1) Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (IACHR). 
30
 See X v UK (8416/78), 13 May 1980; Boso v Italy (50490/99), 5 September 2002; Vo v France, (53924/00), 8 
July 2004, para.82. 
31
 Compare Art 15(2) ECHR and Art 27(2) IACHR. 
32
 S Greer - L Wildhaber, ‘Revisiting the Debate about ‘Constitutionalising’ the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (2012) 12(4) HRLR 655, 680. 
33
 N Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (OUP, 2010), 126. 
34
 Ibid, 139. 
35
 Helfer, cit, 120. 
36
 J Sweeney, ‘Margins of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European Court of Human Rights in the 
Post-Cold War era’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 459. 
37
 R Spano, ‘Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity’ (2014) 14 
HRLR 487, 493. 
38
 Tyrer v UK (5856/72), 25 April 1978, para.31. 
39
 Marckx v Belgium (6833/74), 13 June 1979, para.41. 
40
 Preamble (emphasis added). 
41
 C Draghici, ‘The Human Rights Act in the Shadow of the European Convention: Are Copyist’s Errors 
Allowed?’ (2014) 2 EHRLR 154, 157. 
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concern that ‘original consent… did not necessarily extend to the interpretive methods 
deployed by the court’.42 
Admittedly, as Wildhaber et al observed, ‘the Court has never indicated that it 
considers consensus as binding’.43 Rather, the degree of European consensus widens or 
restricts States’ margin of appreciation (Kearns v France,44 Mosley v UK,45 X. v Austria46 
suggest an inversely proportional correlation). Nevertheless, consensus-based expansion of 
obligations resembles the process of creation of customary norms, defined as ‘evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law’.47 The comparative survey is analogous to the ‘objective 
element’ of custom,48 described by the ICJ as ‘constant and uniform usage practised by the 
States’.49 For the purposes of customary rules, ‘[t]he practice of states… embraces not only 
their external conduct with each other, but is also evidenced by such internal matters as their 
domestic legislation, judicial decisions,… and ministerial statements’.50 Given the 
‘persuasive’ and often ‘decisive’ weight of the consensus factor in the Court’s analysis,51 the 
effect of both custom and ‘consensus’ is that a State may find itself bound by a norm to which 
it had not subscribed, if the norm becomes the practice of the overwhelming majority. The 
opinio juris element is more elusive; the introduction of further rights is not necessarily 
accompanied by the belief that they are owed, and therefore does not constitute practice in the 
application of the treaty, nor evidence of new regional custom. However, if most CoE States 
guarantee a certain right, an underlying belief may be presumed that it is required by current 
human rights exigencies. Alternatively, States’ conduct may be said to spell out the common 
values underpinning Convention norms; thus, the question of whether that conduct was 
initially perceived as voluntary loses significance. The ‘psychological’ element has also been 
questioned as a component of customary norms, given its dubious applicability to State 
entities and difficulties in ascertaining it.
52
 Therefore, the classification of European 
consensus as a mere interpretive aid rather than as evidence of supervening obligations has 
limited practical significance.  
European consensus has indeed the capacity to restrict States’ discretion in matters 
engaging highly subjective considerations of public morality or religion, typically deferred to 
domestic judgment, as recognised in Handyside v UK (obscene publication bans),
53
 Wingrove 
v UK (blasphemy laws),
54
 or Müller v Switzerland (seizure of sexually explicit art).
55
 
Supervening European consensus may trump the ‘morality’ defence; Dudgeon v UK for 
instance established that criminalisation of homosexual activity was no longer accepted in 
Europe and therefore inconsistent with the ECHR.
56
 Conversely, wide discretion is afforded 
                                                          
42
 K Dzehtsiarou, ‘Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) Jul PL 534, 537. 
43
 Wildhaber et al, ‘No Consensus on Consensus?’, cit, 262. 
44
 See Kearns v France (35991/04), 10 August 2008, para.74. 
45
 See Mosley v UK (48009/08), 10 May 2011, para.110. 
46
 X. v Austria (19010/07), 19 February 2013, para.148. 
47
 Art 38 ICJ Statute. 
48
 D Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010), 19. 
49
 Asylum Case (Colombia/ Peru), ICJ Reports 1950, 276.  
50
 Jennings - Watts, cit, 26. 
51
 Wildhaber et al, ibid. See also HC Yourow, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of 
European Human Rights Jurisprudence’ (1987-1988) 3 Conn.J.Int'l L. 111, 158: ‘The law of the Convention 
sometimes seems neither more nor less than consensus, or lack thereof’. 
52
 JL Slama, ‘Opinio Juris in Customary International Law’ (1990) 15(2) Okla.City U.L.Rev. 603, 652-655. 
53
 para.50. 
54
 Wingrove v UK (17419/90), 25 November 1996, para.58. 
55
 Müller v Switzerland (10737/84), 24 May 1988, para.36. 
56
 Dudgeon v UK (7525/76), 22 October 1981, paras.40-41; see also Norris v Ireland (10581/83), 26 October 
1988, paras.35-38; Modinos v Cyprus (15070/89), 22 April 1993, para.24. 
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in areas characterised by no clear common ground, e.g. legal status of the foetus (Vo v 
France),
57
 parenthood of children born through assisted reproduction, specifically the position 
of the mother’s lesbian partner (Kerkhoven and Hinke v Netherlands)58 or transsexual partner 
(X, Y and Z v UK),
59
 regulation of IVF treatment (Evans v UK,
60
 SH v Austria),
61
 
compensation for expropriation (James v UK),
62
 religious symbols in public institutions 
(Şahin v Turkey).63 The absence of consensus can expand States’ latitude in areas 
characterised by strict scrutiny; in Animal Defenders International v UK (regulation of paid 
political advertising), the Grand Chamber (GC) recognised that European diversity in political 
thought and democratic vision broadened the otherwise narrow margin of appreciation vis-à-
vis limitations on speech  regarding matters of public interest.
64
  
‘Reverse consensus’ may also legitimise widely accepted restrictions. Thus, in Engel v 
Netherlands the Court upheld distinctions in disciplinary measures between officers and 
servicemen insofar as they ‘had their equivalent in the internal legal system of practically all 
the Contracting states’.65 Similarly, Rasmussen v Denmark conceded that ‘in most [ECHR 
States] the position of the mother and that of the husband are regulated in different ways’ in 
paternity proceedings.
66
 According to Kiyutin v Russia, the common practice of deporting 
HIV-positive aliens supported differences in treatment based on health status.
67
  
The far-reaching impact of ‘European consensus’ in expanding rights or endorsing 
restrictions makes the objective assessment of commonalities critical to the Court’s 
authoritativeness. As Dzehtsiarou suggested, ‘only European consensus which is consistently 
applied and based on rigorous and verifiable data can enhance the legitimacy of the ECtHR’.68 
Furthermore, attention to domestic laws avoids disobedience or ‘critical loyalty’69 from 
municipal courts.  
 
 
B. CONSENSUS METHODOLOGY: A ‘CHECKLIST’ OF CRITERIA?   
 
A credible assessment of consensus cannot be limited to an impressionistic statement, 
especially when the legislative trend is disputed by the parties.
70
 This was the case in Mazurek 
v France, where the Court noted, without any comparative analysis, ‘a distinct tendency in 
favour of eradicating discrimination against adulterine children’.71 Many judgments include, 
however, a meticulous examination of practice in a dedicated section. The detailed analysis of 
penal systems in Vinter v UK
72
 allowed the GC to formulate prescriptive standards for review 
                                                          
57
 Vo v France (53924/00), 8 July 2004, para.82. 
58
 Kerkhoven and Hinke v Netherlands (15666/89), 19 May 1992.  
59
 X, Y and Z v UK (21830/93), 22 April 1997, para.44. 
60
 Evans v UK (6339/05), 10 April 2007, para.81. 
61
 SH v Austria (57813/00), 3 November 2011, paras.94-116. 
62
 James v UK (8793/79), 21 February 1986, para.65. 
63
 Şahin v Turkey (44774/98), 10 November 2005, para.109. 
64
 Animal Defenders International v UK (48876/08), 22 April 2013, para.123. 
65
 Engel v Netherlands (5100-2/71;5354/72;5370/72), 8 June 1976, para.72. 
66
 Rasmussen v Denmark (8777/79), 28 November 1984, para.41. 
67
 Kiyutin v Russia (2700/10), 10 March 2011, para.65. 
68
 K Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights (CUP, 
2015), 2. 
69
 Greer - Wildhaber, cit, 683. 
70
 The erga omnes value of ECtHR’s interpretation requires a comparative analysis even when the parties are in 
agreement. 
71
 Mazurek v France (34406/97), 1 February 2000, para.52. 
72
 Vinter v UK (66069/09;130/10;3896/10), 9 July 2013, paras.68-75. 
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of detention under life sentences, notwithstanding States’ wide discretion in criminal justice 
matters.
73
 In Stummer v Austria, a comparative survey of social security legislation
74
 
supported the refusal to consider work in prison when calculating pension rights.
75
 Similarly, 
the conclusion in Sindicatul ‘Pastorul cel Bun’ v Romania that no consensus existed on trade 
unions for priests relied on the review of constitutional models governing the relationship 
between State and religious denominations.
76
 In Godelli v Italy, although the operative part 
did not reference the comparative law section on the right to know one’s origins,77 it 
undoubtedly informed the conclusion that a rigid system of non-disclosure exceeded the 
margin of appreciation.
78
 Occasionally, instead of conducting its own research, the Court 
relies on independent surveys produced by the respondent or intervening third parties. In TV 
Vest AS v Norway, the Court thus accepted Norway’s submission of an electoral rights survey 
by the European Platform of Regulatory Authorities.
79
 
Even where the comparative analysis is present, its scope may be problematic. Ideally, 
all member States should be included, as was the case in Schalk and Kopf v Austria,
80
 Kiyutin 
v Russia
81
 or Lautsi v Italy.
82
 Assessments based on a mere sample are doubtful when the 
population is randomly selected. For instance, the comparative study conducted in Markin v 
Russia was based solely on 33 States, with no discussion of the selection criteria (e.g. 
geopolitical representativeness) or impact on statistical relevance.
83
 Equivocation on what 
constitutes a sufficient majority is also unhelpful. The Court unsurprisingly characterised 40 
States (85% of the ECHR community) as a ‘substantial majority’ in A, B and C v Ireland,84 
however less clear-cut majorities were inconsistently assessed. According to an obiter in 
Dickson v UK, although 30 States out of 47 (over 63%) allowed for conjugal visits in prison, 
they were not mandatory under Article 8.
85
 Conversely, in Markin the Court found, on the 
basis of 28 out of 33 States reviewed (60%) that ‘in a majority of European countries,… the 
legislation now provides that parental leave may be taken by civilian men and women’.86 The 
parameters within which consensus emerges remain unclear. 
A related problem is the correct basis for comparison, as the aspects in contention are 
not always socially significant/ subject to legislative debate in all States. In Vallianatos v 
Greece, by reducing the comparison to the 19 States having introduced registered 
partnerships,
87
 the Court distorted the real question, i.e. the availability of legal recognition 
for same-sex couples, in whatever form. Similarly, in X. v Austria, regarding second-parent 
adoption for same-sex partners, the GC limited the analysis to the ten States allowing second-
parent adoption in unmarried couples.
88
 By overlooking the fact that 35 States contemplated 
no access to either joint or second-parent adoption for same-sex couples, the Court 
circumvented the crux of the dispute, namely the existence of consensus on giving a child two 
                                                          
73
 para.120. 
74
 Stummer v Austria (37452/02), 7 July 2011, para.60. 
75
 para.105. 
76
 Sindicatul ‘Pastorul cel Bun’ v Romania (2330/09), 9 July 2013, paras.61, 171. 
77
 Godelli v Italy (33783/09), 25 September 2012, paras.28-32. 
78
 paras.57-58. 
79
 TV Vest AS v Norway (21132/05), 11 December 2008, paras.24, 65.  
80
 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (30141/04), 24 June 2010, para.58. 
81
 paras.37-38, 65. 
82
 Lautsi v Italy (30814/06), 18 March 2011, paras.26-27. 
83
 Markin v Russia (30078/06), 22 March 2012, paras.71-75. 
84
 para.235.  
85
 Dickson v UK (44362/04), 4 December 2007, para.81. 
86
 para.140. 
87
 Vallianatos v Greece (29381/09;32684/09), 7 November 2013, paras.25-26, 91. 
88
 paras.55, 149. 
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legal mothers (or fathers). An example of correct restriction of the comparator is S.A.S. v 
France: ‘the question of the wearing of the full-face veil in public is simply not an issue at all 
in a certain number of member States, where this practice is uncommon’.89 For the dissenters, 
‘[t]he fact that 45 out of 47 member States… have not deemed it necessary to legislate in this 
area’ was ‘a very strong indicator for a European consensus’;90 the fallacy of this analysis lies 
in the fact that unresponsiveness to non-existent problems has no evidentiary value. In fact, 
the consensus doctrine measures attitudes and legal solutions adopted in respect of similar 
socio-political dilemmas. 
To provide an accurate reflection of regional practice, consensus must be not only 
quantitatively relevant, but also geopolitically representative. In Hachette Filipacchi v 
France, the evidence of consensus on strict regulation of tobacco advertising was largely 
based on EU law (and two non-binding CoE Parliamentary Assembly resolutions).
91
 This 
raises methodological concerns: firstly, EU harmonisation is indicative of sub-regional 
custom and cannot be equated with ECHR consensus; secondly, the 28 EU States account for 
less than 60% of ECHR membership, and consensus jurisprudence, customary law and voting 
systems within international organisations suggest that simple majority is insufficient to create 
new obligations; thirdly, it would lead to the paradoxical effect of subjecting CoE to the 
volition of EU institutions (including decisions reached by a EU majority, hence even less 
representative Europe-wide); finally, if consensus operates by analogy with customary law, 
there cannot be entire subregional blocks outside the alleged normative trend. 
Conversely, inferring consensus from treaties ratified by numerous CoE States is 
consistent with the reference in Article 31(3)(c) VCLT to ‘relevant rules of international law 
applicable in relations between the parties’ as auxiliary tools for interpretation. As Mosley v 
UK indicated, ‘any standards set out in applicable international instruments and reports are 
relevant to the interpretation of the guarantees of the Convention and in particular to the 
identification of any common European standard in the field’.92 An example is National 
Union of RMT Workers v UK (concerning the right to strike), where the Court held that ‘the 
practice of European States reflecting their common values’ encompassed the International 
Labour Organisation Convention no. 87 and the European Social Charter.
93
 However, the 
weight of treaties as ‘State practice’ depends on the number of ratifications.94 Low levels of 
ratification cannot dispense with the comparative review of domestic laws. Controversially, in 
Marckx v Belgium the Court found ‘a clear measure of common ground’ on the position of 
illegitimate children in two treaties,
95
 each ratified by only four States.
96
 As Wildhaber et al 
pointed out, the Court ‘relied on the mere paper existence of treaties, rather than on the reality 
of their status as instruments binding in international law’.97 Another example is Brauer v 
Germany, where the consensus analysis was limited to the European Convention on the Legal 
Status of Children Born out of Wedlock, ratified by 21 States.
98
 Arguably, where the 
consensus method would not support a progressive conclusion, rather than compromising the 
doctrine’s integrity through far-fetched applications, the Court should focus on alternative 
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hermeneutic principles. 
Another difficulty regards the value attached to non-European practice. International 
trends may corroborate European consensus as persuasive authority/ supporting evidence, 
especially when the numbers in Europe are not compelling. For instance, Vinter v UK found 
irreducible life sentences in contrast with both the European and international prevailing 
practice.
99
 Conversely, evolutive interpretation cannot be exclusively/ primarily grounded on 
extra-European practice. In Goodwin v UK, the Court critically ‘attache[d] less importance to 
the lack of evidence of a common European approach…, than to the clear and uncontested 
evidence of a continuing international trend in favour… of legal recognition of the new sexual 
identity of post-operative transsexuals’.100 This failed to recognise that the relevant 
‘subsequent practice’ for treaty interpretation is that of the contracting parties, insofar as it 
expresses implied consent to new obligations. Instead of destabilising the consensus 
methodology, the Court could have justified the finding of violation by focusing on the 
disproportionate impact on transsexuals and the inconsistency of domestic legislation. In fact, 
medical recognition (and irreversible treatment) of gender dysphoria without legal recognition 
of the acquired gender placed transsexuals in a legal limbo.
101
 Whereas judgments limited to 
the respondent’s situation (such as the earlier B v France)102 afford relief only within 
particular jurisdictions, the incremental approach preserves legitimacy and fosters acceptance.  
Whilst a comparative review is not always necessary, uneven application to similar 
disputes is problematic, as is the refusal to engage in the consensus analysis when the 
argument is raised by the litigants. In E.B. v France, the Court thus disregarded the 
government’s contention that no consensus existed on the eligibility of single homosexual 
applicants to adopt, with only nine out of 46 States permitting gay adoption.
103
 This is even 
more critical since in the analogous Fretté v France the Court had found it ‘indisputable that 
there is no common ground on the question’.104 Overruling Fretté without addressing the 
main stumbling block raises legitimacy doubts, especially since, as Tobin and McNair’s study 
suggests, gay adoption ‘remain[ed] limited to only a handful of states’ and usually to step-
parent adoption.
105
 The subsequent Alekseyev v Russia indicated that no European consensus 
has been reached on allowing same-sex couples to adopt;
106
 yet if single applicants’ sexual 
orientation cannot bar their eligibility to adopt, a couple’s sexual orientation should not either. 
Evidently sweeping the consensus question under the carpet may generate inconsistencies. 
The scholarship is not unanimous, however, on the need for transparency and 
consistency in the consensus analysis. For Mahoney, ‘[i]n order to reduce to a minimum the 
inevitable element of the judge’s looking at society’s values through his or her own 
spectacles, there should be some methodology’.107 Conversely, for Legg ‘it is not desirable for 
the Tribunals to calculate the current practice of states with precision’, because the provision 
of limited information on methodology facilitates ‘the balancing of apologism and utopianism 
                                                          
99
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100
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in their reasoning’.108 Methodological confusion is arguably not conducive to judicial 
flexibility nor self-assertiveness, but to impaired legitimacy. Blurring the methodological 
basis of evolutive interpretation diminishes the potential of judicial revision to function as 
tenable alternative to inter-governmental treaty amendment/ additional protocols. It also 
appears misguided to assume that clarity would reduce latitude in interpreting the comparative 
data. The degree of crystallisation of consensus warrants a different intensity of scrutiny, and 
the interplay between consensus and other criteria (importance of the right, proportionality 
etc.) affords the comparative review the weight required by the circumstances of the case. 
The doctrine could be reorganised around several cumulative criteria: a comparative 
survey encompassing all States or a sample representative of all major geopolitical blocks, as 
historically defined (e.g. Western Europe, Eastern Europe); reliance on treaties widely ratified 
by CoE States in lieu of, or to corroborate, the comparative law analysis; the rule must be 
observed by a highly qualified majority (with a higher ratio for correction if assessment is 
based on a sample); no contrary practice from any geopolitical block (conversely, the 
departure of a minority of States from the rule should not bar its formation); use of extra-
European trends as persuasive authority (not as substitutive evidence). Judicial amendment 
would thereby acquire the same credentials as regional custom, preserving State consent as 
underpinning source of legitimacy and reconciling supra-national law-making with sovereign 
democracy. When contemplating in Schalk and Kopf the future reading of same-sex marriage 
into the Convention contingent upon wider European practice,
109
 the ECtHR itself alluded to 
the value of State consent as the foundation of evolutive interpretation. 
 
 
C. THE ‘ISOLATED POSITION’: WHAT SCOPE FOR PERSISTENT OBJECTION 
IN A SUPRA-CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK? 
 
If the practice of a substantial CoE majority generates binding ECHR standards, the question 
arises whether one or few jurisdictions having lagged behind are automatically in 
contravention. According to F v Switzerland, ‘the fact that, at the end of a gradual evolution, a 
country finds itself in an isolated position as regards one aspect of its legislation does not 
necessarily imply that that aspect offends the Convention’.110 In practice, however, this 
contrast (in F, the absence of time bars on remarriage in other States) tends to result in a 
finding of violation. This is occasionally rationalised by the Court under the proportionality 
assessment (a restriction most States deem unnecessary cannot be strictly required). Thus, in 
Paksas v Lithuania (concerning impeached presidents’ permanent ineligibility to stand for 
parliamentary elections), the GC noted that ‘Lithuania’s position in this area constitutes an 
exception in Europe’,111 and the immutability of disqualification was judged 
disproportionate.
112
 Vallianatos v Greece, while reiterating that isolated positions do not 
automatically violate the Convention, indicated that the existence of consensus requires the 
country swimming against the tide to provide ‘convincing and weighty’ justifications.113 
Faced with an individual exception in Khoroshenko v Russia (stricter regime for family visits 
in prison), the GC merely found that the discrepancy narrowed the margin of appreciation;
114
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this affected, however, the demonstration of necessity and proportionality and the defence 
was unsuccessful. These cases suggest that the F v Switzerland principle is a doctrinal 
concession, whereas compelling justifications for an isolated position are nearly unachievable. 
Admittedly, from a pragmatic perspective, it seems unnecessary for the Court to antagonise 
States and diminish the value of consensualism in the formation of international law, if it can 
less controversially deal with the deviation in the analysis of proportionality. From a 
constitutionalist perspective, one might nevertheless prefer a firmer stance on the opposability 
of new quasi-unanimous rules to individual objectors as a matter of ECHR law. 
More problematically, the isolated position exceptionally triumphed in A, B and C v 
Ireland.
115
 Although the Court acknowledged the ‘consensus amongst a substantial majority... 
towards allowing abortion on broader grounds than accorded under Irish law’116 (on demand 
in 40 States and on health/ well-being grounds in 35), it ‘d[id] not consider that this consensus 
decisively narrows the broad margin of appreciation of the State’.117 Thirty years earlier, the 
Commission in Brüggemann v FRG noted the unsettled state of the law in this area
118
 and 
dismissed the complaint due to lack of consensus.
119
 The Court in A, B and C fails to engage 
with the Brüggemann analysis; the only argument adduced in support of self-restraint is that 
where life begins and whether unborn life is covered by Article 2 are matters within States’ 
discretion.
120
 The Court thus focuses on the diverse regulation of foetal rights rather than on 
the actual issue before it: the current consensus on the pre-eminence of the mother’s right to 
self-determination (subsumed under ‘private life’). It surprisingly makes no reference to its 
jurisprudence (X v UK, Boso v Italy) establishing that any claims of prospective fathers 
opposing abortion (including on behalf of the unborn child) are outweighed by the expectant 
mothers’ rights.121 Nor does the analysis of proportionality convince. It invokes the legality 
of, and accessibility of information about, travelling abroad for an abortion;
122
 this policy, on 
the contrary, calls into question the necessity of the absolute prohibition (including on health 
grounds) and the adequacy of pre-natal life protection, limited to underprivileged women 
unable to travel overseas.  
The CoE approach to death penalty casts further doubt on the suitability of deference 
to isolated positions. Although Article 2 permits capital punishment, all member States had 
abolished it as of 1996, and a Parliamentary Assembly resolution made the willingness to 
ratify Protocol 6 (prohibiting capital punishment in time of peace) and to introduce a 
moratorium on executions prerequisites for accession.
123
 Upon becoming a CoE member, 
Russia committed to a moratorium and to abolishing death penalty within three years.
124
 This 
suggests that a regional customary norm prohibiting death penalty has emerged, and isolated 
positions are unacceptable when the quasi-totality of CoE States has moved in a more rights-
protective direction. This also impacts on judicial interpretation. According to Soering v UK, 
‘subsequent practice could be taken as establishing the agreement of the Contracting States to 
abrogate the exception’, however Protocol 6 ‘shows that the intention… was to adopt the 
normal method of amendment’.125 Ocalan v Turkey also intimated that Article 2 might have 
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been modified by subsequent practice (wide ratification of Protocol 6, CoE policy requiring 
an undertaking to abolish capital punishment as a condition for admission).
126
 In the presence 
of an optional Protocol removing the express exception, the Court understandably preferred 
self-restraint. As Mowbray explained, ‘[t]he Court would be clearly trespassing upon the 
policy-making powers of member States if it sought to circumvent the Convention 
amendment process by interpreting the existing text to achieve similar developments’.127 
Subsequently in Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v UK, the Court was prepared to find that the wide 
ratification of Protocol 13 (complete abolition of capital punishment) and consistent State 
practice ‘are strongly indicative that Article 2 has been amended so as to prohibit the death 
penalty in all circumstances’.128 Admittedly, the Court did not rely solely on Article 2, but in 
conjunction with Protocol 13.
129
 Similarly, in Al Nashiri v Poland, it invoked Article 2 taken 
together with Protocol 6, as against a ratifying State.
130
 The conclusive test for amendment by 
a supervening customary rule was A.L. (X.W.) v Russia, which relied on Article 2 exclusively, 
against a non-party to Protocols 6 or 13.
131
 If isolated positions are untenable in the presence 
of explicit textual exceptions, this applies a fortiori to open-ended provisions such as Article 
8.
132
  
Against this background, the A, B and C judgement is a dangerous concession to 
obsolete national laws, and a departure from the Court’s rejection of consensus within the 
respondent’s society as a counter-argument to European consensus. The UK had 
unsuccessfully argued in Tyrer that judicial corporal punishment in the Isle of Man ‘was not 
in breach of the Convention since it did not outrage public opinion in the Island’.133 In 
Dudgeon the Court had dismissed arguments for the criminalisation of homosexual relations 
based on the conservative and religious attitudes of Northern Irish society
134
/ ‘the moral 
climate in Northern Ireland in sexual matters’.135 European concert arguably establishes a 
priority of rights. As Greer noted, ‘even a strong national abhorrence of such behaviour 
cannot prevail against the intrinsic importance of the right’.136 Equally unsuccessful was the 
submission in Lautsi v Italy that the presence of crucifixes in classrooms ‘was the expression 
of a “national particularity”,... attributable to... a deeply rooted and long-standing attachment 
to the values of Catholicism’.137 As Ryan points out, ‘the Court was clear that its deference to 
Italy was not based on Italy’s internal consensus, but rather on the absence of European 
consensus’.138  
By contrast, in A, B and C the Court agreed that overwhelming European consensus 
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was outweighed by local sentiment.
139
 As De Londras and Dzehtsiarou observed, ‘[t]o allow 
the alleged values of a particular State to be exempted from the general minimum standard… 
is clearly out of step with the development of a European public order’.140 Arguably, the role 
of supra-national supervision is precisely to call into question deeply rooted traditions and 
legal inertia. As Costa noted, the Court, ‘with its international composition, representing all 
of the legal cultures and systems of Europe’, can act as an ‘external auditor’, requiring States 
to ‘modif[y] rules or practices that were long deemed unproblematic until they were subject 
to the external scrutiny’.141 Moreover, as Warbrick’s comment on Tyrer suggested, ‘[o]nce 
the content of a right is established, good, local arguments cannot justify diminishing it’.142 
This deference to exceptionalism in A, B and C challenges the Strasbourg Court’s role 
as guarantor of regional custom in the area of human rights. Admittedly, new standards 
cannot be read into the Convention in the presence of a ‘collective persistent objector’; if an 
entire group (e.g. Eastern European States) never followed the alleged rule, it is doubtful 
whether that rule has acquired ECHR-wide opposability. Conversely, individual persistent 
objectors should not preclude the Court from finding that a new obligation exists under the 
Convention.
143
 In the practice of international law, as Stein noted, ‘the principle of the 
persistent objector has played a very limited role in the legal relations of states’.144 Jennings 
and Watts also emphasised that ‘a dissenting state cannot free itself by an act of will from the 
obligations imposed on it by a rule of customary law’.145  
There is no reason to contest the analogous functioning of modificative human-rights 
treaty interpretation. If the overwhelming majority of ECHR signatories understand and apply 
a norm differently from the respondent, this cements the Court’s ability to conclude that the 
Convention law has moved on. One State should therefore not be able to unilaterally opt out 
of what becomes the shared perception of a Convention right across the CoE community. If 
individual persistent objection is doubtful under customary law, there is even less scope for it 
in relation to an obligation which merely expands an extant commitment, consensually 
undertaken upon ratification/ accession. Furthermore, a veto right is inconsistent with the 
quasi-constitutional nature of the ECHR system, revolving around a supranational bill of 
rights inspired from the members’ ‘common heritage’, the interpretation of which was 
entrusted to a binding collective enforcement machinery. 
 
 
D. ‘LOCAL CONSENSUS’ AND THE COURT’S ROLE IN RELATION TO 
DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 
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A different recourse to ‘local consensus’ allows the Court, when unable to rely on European 
consensus to effect change, to shift the attention to attitudes within the national community 
and expand rights solely within the respondent State. The Oliari v Italy decision was largely 
based on circumstances peculiar to the respondent State and did not purport to have a reach 
beyond it: ‘the Italian legislature seems not to have attached particular importance to the 
indications set out by the national community, including the general Italian population and 
the highest judicial authorities in Italy’.146 Without engaging in a hasty extrapolation of pan-
European rules, the Court signalled that recognition of same-sex unions no longer is a 
discretionary area and States will be held accountable if the law does not reflect the more 
progressive views of their populations.  
This approach allowed the Court to depart from its ambiguous position in Schalk and 
Kopf, where it noted an ‘emerging European consensus’ towards the legalisation of same-sex 
unions and held that States retained discretion as to the ‘timing of the introduction of 
legislative changes’.147 Lau interpreted the judgment as establishing the right, but according a 
‘grace period’ to States;148 it is doubtful, however, whether an obligation sine die can purport 
to constitute a legal obligation at all. In Oliari the Court abandoned this practically 
inconsequential stance; nor did it overstretch the significance of State practice as in 
Vallianatos.
149
 Instead, the Court proceeded to deconstruct the State, traditionally viewed as a 
unitary interlocutor at international level, and identified its ‘vital forces’150 in the popular 
will. It highlighted ‘the sentiments of a majority of the Italian population, as shown through 
official surveys’, the ‘popular acceptance of homosexual couples’ and the ‘popular support 
for their recognition and protection’.151 The outcome of domestic constitutional review could 
be seen as another indicator of the local moral compass: ‘the Constitutional Court, notably 
and repeatedly called for a juridical recognition of the relevant rights and duties of 
homosexual unions’.152  
Admittedly, the Strasbourg Court is less well-positioned than domestic authorities to 
measure public opinion and ought not, as a rule, substitute its assessment of what society 
requires. Whilst an international court does not have autonomous means of gauging domestic 
public opinion, it may nevertheless accept evidence from reliable sources (e.g. national 
statistics offices, reputable NGOs); this has already been the Court’s practice for the purpose 
of comparative law reviews.
153
 Moreover, since the presumption in democratic societies is 
that parliamentary acts are the expression of popular will, a survey of public opinion should 
not systematically feature in every Strasbourg judgment.
154
 When, however, a law is deemed 
unconstitutional by the highest domestic judicature, in the exercise of a recognised 
prerogative under constitutional law, that authoritative determination of moral/ legal 
requirements in the respondent State should rebut the presumption and allow the Court to 
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proceed to its own re-assessment of public opinion.  
To invariably equate acts of representative institutions (ie legislative majoritarianism) 
with popular will would amount to a reductive, procedural approach to democracy, which 
does not reflect its ECHR meaning. Greer observed in fact that the ECHR ‘democratic 
principle’ has been gradually refined, from mere opposition to totalitarianism to requirements 
such as the separation of powers and accountability.
155
 As emphasised in Young, James and 
Webster v UK, ‘democracy does not simply mean that the views of a majority must always 
prevail’.156 Arguably, the constitutional control mechanism in the Italian legal system 
designates the Constitutional Court as the final arbiter in controversies over the just 
composition of conflicts of rights.
157
 The Strasbourg proceedings thus indirectly restored the 
constitutional division of power between the legislature and the judiciary, and therefore the 
effectiveness of democratic checks and balances. To that extent, the Court’s novel approach 
in Oliari, rather than being anti-democratic, promotes the proper functioning of democracy.  
If that reasoning is correct, then it invites a further question: is it the Court’s place to 
concern itself with the correct working of democratic channels involving legislatures and 
courts in a Convention State? One possible response is to recognise that the margin of 
appreciation afforded to States is predicated on the assumption that they are democracies 
based on the rule of law.
158
 As Mahoney noted, that doctrine ‘presupposes, as a condition for 
its application, the normal functioning of democratic process at national level’.159 Neuman 
interestingly pointed out that the unpopularity of the margin of appreciation with other 
human-rights bodies is due to the lack of democratic credentials elsewhere.
160
 Arguably, the 
Court owes less deference to domestic deliberation if it becomes apparent that democratic 
inter-institutional dialogue malfunctions and that there is a disconnect between legislative 
action, public opinion and judicial appraisal. In exceptional circumstances, in the presence of 
red flags such as judgments of unconstitutionality, the Strasbourg Court is legitimised to look 
beyond the State. 
Additionally, the passivity of the legislature in Oliari
161
 stands in contrast with the 
lengthy deliberation at the origin of the contested measures in Animal Defenders 
International
162
 and S.A.S.
163
 Where a law stems from extensive public debate, the Court’s 
approach is more deferential, as required by the pervasive support for democracy in the 
Convention.
164
 By contrast, restrictions arising from legislative oversight are arguably 
unlikely to be ‘necessary in a democratic society’. It could even be maintained that, when 
courts and opinion polls suggest that a restriction no longer enjoys societal support, there is at 
least a ‘duty to consult’ on potential reform, whether or not the legislative bill is ultimately 
approved.  
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Finally, as established in Wemhoff v Germany, when several interpretations of a right 
are possible, the one more favourable to the individual must be adopted.
165
 Having to choose 
between the conflicting positions of two branches of government (both amounting to 
expressions of the ‘State’), namely a rights-restrictive legislative omission and a judgment of 
unconstitutionality upholding the right, the ECtHR may legitimately prefer the latter. 
Especially when the constitutional court’s interpretation is ostensibly supported by public 
opinion, it should be treated as a more accurate reflection of that society’s present-day 
requirements. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS: ‘RIGHTS-MAXIMISING’ AND ‘RIGHTS-MINIMISING’ 
VERSIONS OF LOCAL CONSENSUS  
 
The codification of the principles of ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘margin of appreciation’ in Protocol 
15
166
 might be read as a political reaction to judicial activism. It is also a reminder that the 
ECHR’s underlying values are not abstract moral notions, independent from the signatories’ 
shared standards.
167
 A distinction must be drawn in particular between gap-filling 
interpretation and contra legem interpretation. The more radical the departure from the 
meaning emerging from textual, holistic and originalist interpretation, the greater the need for 
State practice to justify it, as de facto modificative agreement. Similarly, the more detailed the 
rule the Court wishes to read into the Convention, the more significant the evidentiary support 
of State practice should be, lest the Court become a policy-making forum.  
By overlooking the ECHR emphasis on the democratic society and the subsidiary 
logic of international supervision,
168
 methodologically flawed findings of European consensus 
expose the Court to criticism and mistrust. As Arai-Takahashi argued, it is not desirable ‘to 
enforce standards of the Convention at the expense of regional legitimacy’.169 An important 
concern is to ‘ensur[e] the citizens of Europe the means to articulate and practice their 
preferred values’.170 This entails accepting pluralism in the understanding of certain rights in 
the absence of European consensus. Case-by-case determinations of societal support for a new 
right are a commendable compromise. The Court will thus neither obstruct progress altogether 
by declining to recognise the right, nor proceed to controversially uphold the right as 
mandatory for all States.  
Admittedly, the case-by-case approach does not further the Court’s mission to 
entrench ECHR rights as a common constitutional framework. The consolidation of a 
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‘European public order’171 indeed requires pronouncements valid erga omnes partes. 
Nevertheless, a transitional variable geometry, by introducing progressive interpretation 
within specific national contexts, has the potential to accelerate incipient trends through 
cultural cross-pollination. The local consensus analysis thus merely postpones that ‘quest for a 
pan-European human rights superstructure with constitutional characteristics’.172 Conversely, 
endorsing (or condoning) isolated positions when they perpetuate lower human-rights 
standards goes against the ‘further realisation’ of rights at the core of the ECHR collective 
guarantee system.  
The thesis that the local consensus analysis is legitimate if it widens, but not if it 
narrows, human-rights protection might be criticised as methodological double standard. This 
would be inaccurate. Once the content of a Convention right has been fixed at a certain level 
by generalised practice, a national majority can no longer defend lesser standards by adducing 
its attachment to them. If consensus can be conceptualised as a ‘rebuttable presumption in 
favour of the rule or practice adopted by the majority’,173 in cases of quasi-unanimity in 
Europe rebuttal should not succeed merely through reliance on local preferences, otherwise 
supra-national supervision becomes perfunctory. Conversely, if European consensus is 
insufficiently clear, the decentralisation of ECHR interpretation allows reform to occur first 
where there is a substantial social basis for advancement. By looking beyond the State as 
unitary entity and focusing on public opinion and constitutional arrangements, rather than 
being anti-democratic, the Court acts as a guarantor of democratic process. There is, thus, an 
objective distinction between the ideological and pragmatic foundations of the ‘rights-
maximising’ and ‘rights-minimising’ versions of ‘local consensus’. The Court’s approach to 
the proper use of this doctrine regrettably remains ambivalent.  
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